Somalia’s recent naval partnership with Pakistan represents more than simple military cooperation—it exemplifies how China extends its maritime influence through proxy relationships that appear benign but create lasting dependencies. The defence cooperation agreement signed in August 2025 between Somalia and Pakistan follows a troubling pattern where Islamabad acts as Beijing’s maritime ambassador, drawing vulnerable nations into China’s strategic orbit under the guise of capacity building and security assistance.
A Pattern of Proxy Engagement
Pakistan’s involvement in Somalia’s naval development cannot be viewed in isolation from its deepening maritime partnership with China. The Pakistan Navy’s extensive cooperation with the People’s Liberation Army Navy, including joint exercises like Sea Guardian in the Arabian Sea, demonstrates how Pakistan has become an integral component of China’s Indo-Pacific strategy. When Pakistan offers naval training to Somalia, it brings with it the operational doctrines, equipment preferences, and strategic outlook that Beijing has carefully cultivated through years of military-to-military exchanges.
The timing of Pakistan’s outreach to Somalia is particularly revealing. As China seeks to expand its maritime footprint in the Indian Ocean through its Belt and Road Initiative, Pakistan has emerged as a crucial intermediary. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, centred around the strategically vital Gwadar port, has transformed Pakistan into a central part of China’s transition from a regional power to a global one. This transformation extends Pakistan’s role beyond mere bilateral cooperation to serving as a conduit for Chinese influence across the region.
The Mechanics of Maritime Dependency
Somalia’s agreement with Pakistan encompasses comprehensive naval development, including training programmes at all levels, counterterrorism operations, and technical support for launching new naval units. However, such extensive assistance creates structural dependencies that extend far beyond simple capacity building. When a nation rebuilds its navy through foreign expertise, it inevitably adopts the operational procedures, maintenance requirements, and strategic thinking of its benefactor.
The Somalia-Pakistan arrangement mirrors other Chinese-influenced maritime partnerships where initial assistance evolves into long-term dependence. The pattern is evident in Pakistan’s own relationship with China, where naval modernisation through Chinese submarines, frigates, and joint exercises has created an integrated operational framework. Somalia risks following this same trajectory, where initial training assistance gradually expands into equipment dependence, operational integration, and strategic alignment.
Turkey’s Role and the Multiplication Effect
Somalia’s concurrent naval partnership with Turkey adds another layer of complexity to this dependency web. Turkey has established a significant maritime presence in Somalia, including plans for naval base operations and control over hydrocarbon exploration rights. The emergence of joint Pakistan-Turkey discussions about missile and space-testing sites in Somalia suggests a coordinated approach where multiple Chinese partners work in concert to expand influence.
This multiplication effect—where several Chinese partners simultaneously engage with Somalia—creates overlapping dependencies that are difficult to disentangle. Each partnership appears bilateral on the surface, but collectively they form an integrated network that serves Chinese strategic interests. Somalia finds itself not merely dependent on one partner, but embedded within a complex web of relationships that all ultimately trace back to Beijing’s maritime ambitions.
The Indian Ocean Chess Game
China’s approach to the Indian Ocean entails establishing a network of naval facilities and partnerships across the region. Pakistan’s Gwadar port serves as a crucial pearl in this string, providing China with strategic access to the Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf. Somalia’s partnership with Pakistan extends this strategy westward, potentially providing Chinese naval forces with enhanced access to the Horn of Africa and the critical shipping lanes connecting Asia, Europe, and Africa.
The strategic value of Somalia’s location cannot be overstated. With the longest coastline in Africa stretching over 3,300 kilometres along the Indian Ocean, Somalia sits astride some of the world’s most critical maritime trade routes. Chinese commercial interests in the region are already substantial, with Chinese fishing vessels operating in Somali waters and Chinese anti-piracy operations providing Beijing with valuable operational experience.
Regional Destabilisation
Somalia’s naval partnerships with Pakistan and Turkey have already generated regional tensions, particularly with Ethiopia and Kenya. These tensions reflect how foreign naval presence can destabilise regional relationships and create new sources of conflict. As Somalia becomes more dependent on external naval partners, its ability to pursue independent regional policies diminishes, potentially drawing it into conflicts that serve foreign rather than Somali interests.
The proliferation of foreign naval bases and partnerships across the Horn of Africa—including Chinese facilities in Djibouti, Turkish operations in Somalia, and various other arrangements—creates a complex security environment where local conflicts become proxy competitions between external powers. Somalia risks becoming a chess piece in these larger geopolitical games rather than an independent actor pursuing its own interests.
The Path to Dependency
What begins as technical assistance and capacity building gradually evolves into structural dependency through several mechanisms. First, training partnerships create intellectual dependency, where Somalia’s naval officers learn operational procedures and strategic thinking aligned with Chinese interests. Second, equipment transfers create maintenance and upgrade dependencies that require ongoing relationships with suppliers. Third, joint operations create operational integration that limits Somalia’s independent decision-making capabilities.
The cumulative effect of these dependencies is a gradual erosion of strategic autonomy. Somalia may find itself unable to pursue policies that conflict with Chinese interests, whether in maritime boundary disputes, resource exploration agreements, or regional security arrangements. The country becomes locked into relationships that serve external strategic objectives while limiting its own policy flexibility.
Conclusion
Somalia’s experience illustrates the broader challenge facing developing nations seeking to build maritime capabilities in an era of great power competition. The immediate need for naval capacity can create long-term vulnerabilities that are difficult to reverse once established. Alternative approaches that prioritise genuine multilateralism, democratic oversight, and transparent arrangements offer better prospects for maintaining sovereignty while building capabilities.
The international community must recognise how seemingly benign capacity-building arrangements can serve broader strategic objectives that undermine recipient countries’ long-term interests. Somalia’s naval partnerships with Pakistan demonstrate how China’s influence extends through proxy relationships that create dependencies without the visibility of direct Chinese involvement. Understanding these mechanisms is crucial for developing policies that support genuine capacity building while preserving democratic sovereignty and regional stability.
Somalia’s experience serves as a cautionary tale for other nations facing similar choices. What appears to be generous assistance in maritime capacity building may actually represent the first steps toward strategic dependency that serves external powers’ interests rather than recipient countries’ long-term sovereignty and security needs.
(Hailing from Kashmir and based in New Delhi, Mehak Farooq is a journalist specialising in defence and strategic affairs. Her work spans security, geopolitics, veterans’ welfare, foreign policy, and the evolving challenges of national and regional stability.)