In the vast arena of South Asian geopolitics, few bilateral relationships are as enduring, strategic and intriguing as that between China and Pakistan. Often termed as “iron brothers” and “all-weather allies”, this alliance has not only withstood decades of global transitions and regional instability but has also deepened in recent years despite Pakistan’s economic instability, international isolation and security challenges. What motivates a rising global superpower like China to continue supporting Pakistan at such strategic, diplomatic and financial costs? The answer lies not in sentiment or historical camaraderie alone but in a complex web of strategic compulsions that bind Beijing to Islamabad.
One of the most compelling reasons for China’s consistent support of Pakistan lies in its long-term strategy to counterbalance India’s rise as a regional and global power. As India grows stronger economically and militarily and as its influence expands through partnerships such as the Quad and closer ties with the United States, China feels increasingly compelled to ensure that New Delhi’s ambitions are kept in check. A strong and engaged Pakistan on India’s western flank ensures that India remains preoccupied with regional security, thereby curtailing its ability to challenge China in the Indo-Pacific or on broader international platforms. In essence, Pakistan serves as a vital component of China’s strategy to maintain a balance of power in South Asia. This enduring rivalry with India has made Pakistan a convenient and dependable counterweight in China’s strategic calculus.
China’s investment in Pakistan is not merely diplomatic or symbolic—it is deeply rooted in critical economic interests. The flagship project under the Belt and Road Initiative, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, has positioned Pakistan as a critical artery in China’s geopolitical and geo-economic vision. This massive infrastructure network, connecting China’s western Xinjiang province to the Arabian Sea via Pakistan’s Gwadar Port, provides Beijing with direct and more secure access to key maritime routes. Such access reduces China’s dependence on the vulnerable and congested Strait of Malacca, a maritime chokepoint that could be blockaded during conflict. Moreover, through China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, China aims to develop its backward western regions, particularly Xinjiang, which remains sensitive due to ethnic unrest and separatist tendencies. By fostering economic development through China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, China seeks not only external strategic gains but also internal stability by integrating restive regions into the national economy.
Beyond economics, China’s military relationship with Pakistan is a central pillar of their alliance. Over the years, China has played a vital role in arming Pakistan, supplying advanced weaponry, jointly developing fighter aircraft like the JF-17 Thunder and even aiding Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities. In the backdrop of India’s nuclear emergence in 1998, China moved swiftly to balance the scales by supporting Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions, thereby cementing Islamabad’s role as a strategic buffer. This military cooperation is not just transactional but is aimed at ensuring that Pakistan remains capable of engaging India in the event of conflict. For China, Pakistan represents a strategic partner that can tie down Indian forces and resources, preventing them from concentrating on the Himalayan borders or other theaters of conflict. In scenarios of broader regional conflict, Pakistan would act as a valuable strategic ally, potentially forcing India into a two-front war—something that remains a perpetual concern for Indian military planners.
China’s compulsions also extend into the ideological and religious domain, particularly in managing its image in the Muslim world. Despite facing international criticism over its treatment of the Uighur Muslim population in Xinjiang, China has found an unlikely defender in Pakistan. Successive Pakistani governments, despite being a self-proclaimed defender of Muslim causes globally, have either remained silent or offered muted support to China on the Xinjiang issue. This silence is not accidental—it is a diplomatic trade-off. In return for Beijing’s unwavering political, military and financial support, Islamabad has chosen to ignore the suppression of Uighur Muslims, thereby allowing China to avoid broader condemnation from the Islamic world. Pakistan’s influence in forums like the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation also helps China manage Muslim perceptions globally. In effect, China uses Pakistan as a buffer and a shield in the Islamic world, ensuring that its domestic policies do not result in international diplomatic isolation.
Another significant area where China’s support for Pakistan becomes evident is on global diplomatic platforms, especially the United Nations. China has repeatedly exercised its veto power or influence to shield Pakistan from global scrutiny, especially in matters related to terrorism. Whether it was India’s attempts to designate Jaish-e-Mohammed chief Masood Azhar as a global terrorist or efforts to impose sanctions on certain Pakistan-based individuals and groups, China has stood firmly by Pakistan, often citing technicalities to block such initiatives. This consistent shielding is not just about friendship, it is a strategic move to prevent Pakistan from being weakened diplomatically, as its strategic utility to China would diminish if it were further cornered or sanctioned by the global community. Beijing also understands that a weakened or unstable Pakistan could become a liability, creating a vacuum that could be exploited by China’s rivals.
Pakistan’s increasing dependence on China is another factor that sustains this close relationship. Over the years, Pakistan has accumulated significant debt to China, largely through loans related to China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and other infrastructure projects. While critics warn of a potential debt trap, the reality is that this economic entanglement gives Beijing considerable leverage over Islamabad. China has effectively become Pakistan’s largest creditor, its biggest defense supplier and its most consistent diplomatically. This leverage ensures that Pakistan remains aligned with Chinese interests, even when it means compromising on its own sovereign narratives—such as its silence on Uighur Muslims or complete alignment with Chinese positions on Taiwan, Hong Kong and other international matters. This client-state model benefits China by ensuring a loyal ally that is bound by financial, military and political obligations.
In the broader regional context, especially after the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, China views Pakistan as a critical partner in managing the evolving situation in Central Asia. Beijing harbors deep concerns about extremism spilling over into its own territory and about groups like the East Turkestan Islamic Movement gaining a foothold in a destabilized Afghanistan. Pakistan, with its deep intelligence and military ties to Afghan groups including the Taliban, is viewed by China as an indispensable actor in managing the Afghan theater. Through Pakistan, China seeks to ensure that Afghanistan does not become a haven for anti-China elements, while also protecting its investments and workers in the region. The growing Chinese presence in Afghanistan, whether through mining projects or diplomatic engagement is possible only because of the security and intelligence network that Pakistan offers.
Moreover, China’s strategic aspirations to reduce American influence in South Asia also necessitate a strong alliance with Pakistan. With the United States seeking to consolidate its partnership with India to counterbalance Chinese assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific, Beijing finds in Pakistan a natural counterweight. Through this partnership, China seeks to create a regional bloc that could resist Western influence and offer an alternative global order. Pakistan, with its growing alienation from the West and its increasing dependency on Chinese support, fits perfectly into this strategic vision. Together, China and Pakistan aim to resist what they perceive as a unipolar world order dominated by the United States and its allies.
There is also an unspoken ideological convergence between China and Pakistan. While their governance models are vastly different, both countries share a tendency toward centralized authority, control over the press and intolerance for dissent. Both states have faced criticism for suppressing minorities, Uyghurs in China and Baloch or Ahmadiyya in Pakistan. This shared experience in managing internal dissent through authoritarian measures creates a unique comfort level between their leaderships, making cooperation smoother and more predictable. In many ways, China sees in Pakistan a miniature model of how a state can suppress opposition, centralize power and align with global authoritarian trends.
Despite these compulsions, the China-Pakistan relationship is not without its strains. China is increasingly concerned about the security of its nationals in Pakistan, especially in Balochistan, where Chinese engineers and workers have been targeted by separatist groups. Attacks on Chinese nationals and China-Pakistan Economic Corridor assets have prompted Beijing to question Pakistan’s internal security apparatus. Moreover, the growing perception among some Pakistani intellectuals and civil society members about Pakistan’s over-reliance on China—bordering on neo-colonialism, has begun to create murmurs of discontent. Yet, these concerns remain largely overshadowed by the strategic necessities that dominate decision-making in both Beijing and Islamabad.
In conclusion, China’s support for Pakistan is not merely a function of historical camaraderie or political friendship. It is a calculated, multifaceted partnership driven by deep strategic compulsions. From countering India’s rise and ensuring economic connectivity to protecting its western borders and managing regional instability, China sees Pakistan as a vital partner that serves multiple purposes. For Beijing, disengaging from Islamabad would create more risks than rewards. The relationship, though often romanticized as a brotherhood, is in reality a strategic alliance rooted in necessity, pragmatism and mutual benefit. It is not affection that keeps the China-Pakistan axis alive, but a convergence of compulsions that bind the two nations in an enduring embrace.
