The relationship between Pakistan and the United States has always been layered with contradictions, fluctuating between strategic necessity and deep mistrust. Over decades, it has transformed from a Cold War alliance to a transactional security partnership during the War on Terror and now, in the 2020s, it appears to be entering a new phase one marked by ambiguity, pragmatism and geopolitical balancing. With a rapidly shifting global order, Pakistan is neither completely aligned with Washington nor entirely removed from it. It is walking a careful tightrope, seeking advantages where it can, while shielding its core strategic interests from excessive external influence. The question arises what is Pakistan really doing with the United States today?
To understand this evolving relationship, one must look at the broader canvas of regional politics and Pakistan’s internal vulnerabilities. The the United States withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021 was a turning point that recalibrated Washington’s engagement with South Asia. After nearly two decades of military presence in Afghanistan, the the United States exited in haste, leaving behind a Taliban-led state that Washington neither recognizes nor openly engages with. Pakistan, long accused of playing a duplicitous role by supporting the Taliban behind the scenes while being the United States ally in the War on Terror, found itself again in the spotlight. The the United States needed Pakistan’s cooperation to navigate the post-withdrawal chaos, especially for intelligence on terrorist threats and regional stability. Yet, trust was thin, and past grievances loomed large.
In the aftermath of the withdrawal, Pakistan attempted to reintroduce itself as a regional stabilizer. It positioned itself as a necessary partner in managing threats emanating from Afghanistan, particularly from The Islamic State – Khorasan Province and the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan both of which were gaining strength. American officials, while wary, engaged Islamabad cautiously, resuming dialogues at the military and diplomatic levels. the United States Central Command leadership visited Pakistan and high-ranking intelligence and defence officials from both sides held meetings to coordinate counter terrorism efforts. This cooperation was not about renewed alliance but mutual benefit Washington needed a foothold in the region and Pakistan needed support to quell growing militant violence along its western border.
But behind these overtures lies a deeper game. Pakistan’s civilian government and powerful military establishment are acutely aware of the economic lifeline the the United States can provide. Much of Pakistan’s economic bailout packages through the International Monetary Fund are believed to be influenced by American backing. In a country reeling under debt, inflation and dwindling foreign reserves, such support is vital. The International Monetary Fund recent approval of a new loan tranche to Pakistan, after long negotiations over structural reforms and fiscal discipline, came at a time when Islamabad could not afford to default. Although presented as an economic achievement, insiders know that Washington’s informal nod was key to unlocking the funds. Thus, part of Pakistan’s recent engagement with the the United States is economic realism without Washington’s indirect support, the country’s fragile financial system might collapse.
At the same time, Pakistan’s diplomatic overtures in Washington have intensified. Islamabad has pushed for better relations with Congress, the State Department, and influential think tanks. Pakistani diplomats in Washington have held roundtables, briefings and engagements aimed at softening the American perception of the country as a problematic ally. They portray Pakistan as a responsible nuclear power, a frontline state in the fight against extremism, and a victim of regional instability. Yet, American policy circles remain sceptical. Pakistan’s silence on human rights abuses in Xinjiang, its deepening military and economic ties with China, and its lack of progress on democratic reforms are often cited as reasons for caution.
In many ways, the the United States sees Pakistan through a security lens. While other relationships, such as those with India, are increasingly broad-based spanning trade, tech, defense, and climate Pakistan remains confined to issues of terrorism, regional stability, and nuclear safety. This limited engagement reflects a fundamental mistrust, particularly from the American side, which recalls episodes such as the discovery of Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad in 2011. That incident shattered what little faith remained in the relationship. The the United States believed its supposed ally had knowingly sheltered the world’s most wanted terrorist. Although a decade has passed, the shadow of that event continues to affect the United States policymaking regarding Pakistan.
Interestingly, Pakistan is trying to play both sides of the geopolitical spectrum. While seeking economic favors and diplomatic rehabilitation from the the United States, it remains firmly tied to China through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. Beijing remains Islamabad’s largest infrastructure investor, a major arms supplier, and a strong political backer. This has complicated Pakistan’s relationship with the the United States which increasingly views China as a strategic competitor. Washington has warned Pakistan about its growing debt dependency on China and the potential risks of falling into a “debt trap.” However, Pakistan insists that its relationship with China is purely developmental and not aimed at undermining Western interests.
Another layer of complexity is added by Pakistan’s quiet engagement with other regional powers like Iran and Russia. Recently, Islamabad hosted a trilateral forum with officials from Tehran and Moscow, discussing counterterrorism, trade and narcotics control. While these engagements may be routine regional diplomacy, they don’t go unnoticed in Washington. Especially at a time when the the United States is at odds with both Russia over Ukraine and Iran over nuclear tensions, any cooperation between these powers and Pakistan is watched with suspicion. Yet, Islamabad continues to pursue what it calls “strategic autonomy” a foreign policy approach that avoids full alignment with any one power bloc.
One cannot ignore the political backdrop within Pakistan itself. The country has been politically unstable since the ouster of former Prime Minister Imran Khan in 2022. His supporters widely believe that his removal was orchestrated with the United States approval a claim Washington has repeatedly denied. Nonetheless, the narrative has damaged the United States perception among large sections of the Pakistani population. Even today, Khan’s political base promotes the idea that the the United States meddled in Pakistan’s sovereignty. This popular belief, coupled with rising anti-American sentiment in certain quarters, makes it difficult for any Pakistani government to fully embrace the the United States. Yet, the military establishment, which continues to wield enormous influence, is pragmatic. It knows that alienating Washington entirely is not an option, especially when financial assistance and military hardware remain critical needs.
Security cooperation, while limited, still exists. After the resurgence of terrorist attacks in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan in early 2025, Pakistan and the the United States renewed talks on intelligence sharing and counterterrorism operations. There were rumours of Pakistan allowing the the United States limited access to its airspace for surveillance missions in Afghanistan. While these reports were neither confirmed nor denied officially, they reveal the quiet channels through which cooperation continues. For both nations, this cooperation is tactical neither trusts the other fully, but each gains something in the short term.
Amid these layered realities, the real question is not whether Pakistan is aligning with the the United States or drifting away, but whether it is trying to reassert its relevance in a world where its strategic location remains valuable, yet its global image is tarnished. Pakistan is attempting to remain indispensable. It wants to be seen as a bridge between the the United States and the Muslim world, a buffer between China and India and a frontline state against extremism all while managing its own internal crises.
Washington, for its part, is no longer looking to rebuild old alliances on blind faith. It sees the relationship with Pakistan as useful but limited. In a world moving toward great-power competition, the the United States is investing more in partnerships that promise long-term stability, transparency, and shared democratic values none of which Pakistan can fully guarantee at the moment. However, geography still matters, and Pakistan’s strategic location means that it cannot be ignored.
In the end, what Pakistan is really doing with the the United States is trying to remain in the game. It wants to ensure that even if the partnership is no longer central, it remains relevant. It seeks to extract economic concessions, avoid isolation, and position itself as a useful if not entirely trustworthy player in global affairs. For now, both countries seem willing to tolerate this ambiguous, uncomfortable relationship because the alternatives are worse. But how long such a delicate balancing act can continue remains uncertain. The world is changing fast, and in this era of clear choices and strategic clarity, ambiguity may soon become a luxury neither Pakistan nor the US can afford.