When people think of military cooperation, they often picture training drills, shiny equipment handovers, or officers exchanging salutes at joint exercises. What’s harder to see is the quiet machinery that keeps those relationships running: the committees, review boards, and oversight forums that meet year after year. In the case of the Pakistan, Somalia defence pact, that hidden gear is the Joint Defence Cooperation Committee (JDCC).
On the surface, it looks like an annual review meeting. In reality, it could become one of Pakistan’s strongest levers of influence in the Horn of Africa.
Why Does the JDCC Matter?
On paper, the JDCC simply reviews progress, sets priorities, and keeps track of how the agreement is working. But anyone familiar with defence diplomacy knows these bodies often grow into the real centre of gravity. Pakistan’s push for a standing committee suggests it doesn’t just want to send trainers or ships; it wants a seat at the table every year when Somalia’s security direction is discussed.
The imbalance between the two countries makes this especially significant. Somalia’s entire defence budget was about USD 143 million in 2023, rising slightly to USD 201.9 million in 2024. Pakistan, by comparison, spent USD 8.5 billion in 2023 and is planning to raise that by another 20% in FY 2025–26. When one side’s budget is forty times larger, oversight is rarely neutral. It usually means the smaller partner’s decisions are nudged , sometimes gently, sometimes firmly, toward the stronger partner’s priorities.
How Can the JDCC Shape the Agenda?
Control of the agenda means control of the conversation. Through the JDCC, Pakistan can steer discussions toward areas where it has the most to offer. For instance, it could:
• Emphasise naval expansion, tying Somalia’s coastal security more closely to Pakistani assistance.
• Promote counterterrorism training built around Pakistan’s own doctrine and battlefield lessons.
• Watch whether Somalia courts Gulf states or Western trainers, then adjust its own offers to keep itself indispensable.
With Somalia’s armed forces numbering around 15,000 personnel and only about 300 sailors and 300 air force staff even a small training programme or a few dozen scholarships can tilt the balance. That makes every JDCC meeting a lot more than just bureaucracy; it becomes a checkpoint where the direction of Somalia’s military is quietly adjusted.
Does the JDCC Create an Unequal Partnership?
Although the JDCC is formally bilateral, the set-up favours the stronger partner. Pakistan has trained officers, permanent staff, and the resources to prepare thick briefing papers. Somalia, still recovering from decades of conflict, comes to the table with less experience and fewer hands.
Over repeated cycles, this imbalance could lock in dependency. Somali officials may feel they are agreeing as equals, but the structure itself tilts towards Pakistan. The result? Somalia’s priorities slowly bend to fit the expectations of a country whose military machine dwarfs its own.
What Are the Broader Strategic Implications?
The JDCC might not stay a strictly bilateral forum. Pakistan could use it as a platform to coordinate with Turkey, which already runs a military base in Mogadishu, or even with Gulf states that are building influence in the Horn. That would shift Pakistan’s role from simple partner to agenda-setter, giving it regional weight at little cost.
If this works, Islamabad could use the same playbook elsewhere in Africa. Instead of pouring money into bases or deployments, it could replicate the JDCC model: an institutional foothold that lasts long after ministers change or budgets shift.
Where Does This Leave Somalia?
For Mogadishu, the risk is subtle but serious: loss of agency. Even if the committee is formally equal, the rhythm of meetings, the technical sub-groups, and the resource allocations can all be dominated by Pakistani advisors.
Imagine a Somali officer who needs training slots or spare parts. If those depend on JDCC approval, the temptation will be to nod along with Islamabad’s preferred priorities say, focusing on coastal patrols while pressing ground campaigns lag behind, or adopting manuals that fit Pakistani doctrine rather than Somalia’s own community-based security practices.
In that sense, sovereignty can shrink not through conquest but through committee agendas.
What Is the Larger Lesson About Committees?
The JDCC is a reminder that in defence diplomacy, real power often hides in the paperwork. Missiles and budgets make headlines, but it is the committees, commissions, and oversight bodies that keep influence flowing year after year. Unlike one-off arms deals, they build habits and dependencies that are hard to undo.
For regional observers like India, this is a point worth noting. The loud symbols , Djibouti’s bases, naval patrols in the Gulf of Aden, matter, but so do the quiet rooms where training schedules and doctrine choices are agreed. Sometimes, those rooms shape the future more than the ships at sea.
What Does It All Add Up To?
The JDCC is not a side note. It secures Pakistan a permanent role in Somalia’s defence decision-making, without the expense of permanent bases or heavy deployments. For Somalia, it brings in badly needed training, expertise, and resources. The cost, however, could be narrowing sovereignty and a growing reliance on one external partner.
In the end, the JDCC may not make noise like a missile test or a warship docking. But those yearly meetings could quietly prove to be Pakistan’s most effective tool of influence in the Horn of Africa. (JKNS)
