When Somalia’s leaders look at Pakistan’s recent defence offer, it must seem alluring. Training for officers, new naval units and modernisation of equipment. All these promises look like a fast track out of insecurity. But history offers many cautionary tales. Quick fixes from external patrons often come with long-term costs. Sovereignty erodes not in a single blow but through a slow trade of autonomy for aid. Somalia risks locking itself into dependency.
A Pact That Promises Much
The Memorandum of Understanding signed on August 28, 2025, between Somalia and Pakistan appears to offer immediate benefits. Approved by the Somali Cabinet for five years, the agreement outlines extensive cooperation in multiple areas of defence. Pakistan will provide military training at both basic and advanced levels and support courses in counter-terrorism and peacekeeping.
The MoU also extends to the Somali Navy, offering technical assistance, maintenance of vessels and creation of new naval units. It promises help in maritime patrols and anti-piracy operations. Furthermore, Pakistan aims to modernise the Somali armed forces by upgrading equipment and sharing expertise in defence technology. A Joint Defence Cooperation Committee will coordinate the activities and meet annually to review progress.
Short-Term Gains in a Fragile Security Environment
On paper, the MoU seems timely. Somalia continues to struggle with militant threats from Al-Shabaab and other non-state actors. The African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM), which replaced ATMIS, is working to gradually transfer security responsibilities to Somali forces. This handover highlights Somalia’s fragile defence capability.
Pakistan’s involvement thus appears to fill a gap. Its training institutions, including Staff and War Colleges, can offer structured military education and exposure to modern doctrines. For a nation rebuilding from decades of civil war, such partnerships may appear indispensable. Yet the real test lies not in the agreement’s scope but in its sustainability and independence.
The Hidden Cost of Dependency
Critics of the MoU warn that Somalia may be trading sovereignty for security. When foreign nations provide training, logistics and strategic guidance, they often shape the recipient’s military thinking and align it with their own interests. Over time, foreign influence becomes embedded within command structures and operational habits.
Dependence on Pakistan for naval maintenance or modernisation could also delay the development of Somalia’s own technical capabilities. The more a nation relies on external repairs and imported systems, the less incentive it has to invest in domestic infrastructure or human capital. Once foreign trainers depart, the vacuum left behind can expose institutional weaknesses.
This pattern is not new. History is replete with examples where quick external assistance created long-term dependencies. The lesson is that sovereignty is gradually weakened not by invasion but by habitual reliance.
Overlapping Foreign Interests
Pakistan is not alone in seeking influence in the Horn of Africa. Turkey already enjoys deep defence and economic ties with Somalia, including a military base in Mogadishu. The new MoU with Pakistan could lead to overlapping or even competing foreign interests.
Observers also note that Pakistan may seek to coordinate its presence with Turkey, possibly leading to a trilateral arrangement in the future. While such cooperation may appear beneficial, it can entangle Somalia in the strategic ambitions of others. Each new agreement adds another layer of dependency and complicates the country’s ability to make autonomous security decisions.
Erosion of Reform and Oversight
Foreign military assistance can unintentionally weaken domestic governance. When governments receive external aid, they may delay vital reforms in their own defence institutions. If training and equipment are externally sourced, incentives to build transparent procurement systems, internal auditing, or civil-military oversight diminish.
Somalia’s parliament and civil society must therefore play an active role in monitoring foreign defence partnerships. Transparency in budgeting, training commitments and contractual obligations should be non-negotiable. Without accountability, assistance risks becoming opaque and politically exploitative.
Charting a Sustainable Path
Somalia must ensure that external support strengthens, rather than supplants, its internal capacity. The Pakistan MoU should be treated as transitional assistance, being a bridge to self-reliance. The country should insist on clearly defined outcomes, periodic reviews and technology-transfer clauses that genuinely empower local institutions.
Investments in domestic shipyards, technical schools and naval repair facilities will pay greater dividends than foreign-maintained fleets. Building indigenous capacity will ensure that the next generation of Somali sailors and officers operate from a position of ownership rather than dependence.
Moreover, inclusion of local communities in maritime decision-making will prevent alienation. Coastal populations should see external aid as protection of their livelihoods, not as another form of external control.
Conclusion
Somalia’s agreement with Pakistan offers visible short-term advantages, but these should not obscure the long-term risks. Security built on borrowed strength can erode the very foundations of sovereignty.
External assistance must serve as a stepping stone, not a shackle. Somalia’s leaders should look beyond immediate gains and focus on creating sustainable, accountable and self-sufficient defence institutions. The choice before them is stark. Build national capability or remain perpetually dependent.
