Pakistan has long presented itself as a leading voice in the Muslim world. Founded in 1947 as a homeland for Muslims of British India, it has over the decades sought to project itself as a champion of Islamic solidarity, a defender of Muslim causes and a strategic partner for other Muslim-majority states. But in 2024-25 the landscape of Pakistan’s relations with other Islamic nations is increasingly shaped by tension, complexity and paradox by the interplay of border issues, militant groups, regional rivalries, changing diplomatic strategies and shifting perceptions of what being an “Islamic nation-state” means in the 21st century.
This article examines how Pakistan is navigating those turbulent waters; its troubled relationship with neighbouring Afghanistan, its domestic handling of Islamist groups, its diplomatic posture across the Muslim-majority world and the strategic implications of its ambitions for Islamic leadership. One of the most striking manifestations of Pakistan’s diplomatic and security dilemma in the Islamic world lies in its relationship with Afghanistan. While both are Muslim-majority countries, share Pashtun populations along the Durand Line and long histories of cooperation and competition, their current relationship is characterised by mistrust, military friction and unresolved cross-border Islamist dynamics.
For Pakistan, a major point of contention is the presence and activities of the Tehreek‑e‑Taliban Pakistan a militant group Islamabad accuses of using Afghan territory as a sanctuary. At the same time, with the return of the Taliban to power in Kabul in 2021 and its consolidation of control, the nature of that relationship has shifted. Recent reports indicate serious escalation; Pakistan has conducted strikes against Tehreek‑e‑Taliban Pakistan and other militant positions allegedly inside Afghanistan, and Afghanistan has responded with accusations of territorial violation. One report cites that the Taliban claimed to have killed 58 Pakistani soldiers and captured border posts in a flare-up in October 2025.
Sovereignty and the Durand Line: The border between Pakistan and Afghanistan, the Durand Line, remains contested in practice; both sides accuse each other of violating territory and of harbouring hostile groups. This undermines trust between them. Terrorists safe-havens and cross-border terrorism; Pakistan’s security establishment repeatedly demands that Afghan territory not be used as a safe haven for groups like the Tehreek‑e‑Taliban Pakistan. Afghanistan’s retort is that the Tehreek‑e‑Taliban Pakistan is Pakistan’s “internal problem” and that Kabul cannot be made scapegoat.
Strategic depth and India factor: Pakistan fears Afghanistan’s engagement with India (its historic rival) may undermine Islamabad’s influence and create a strategic encirclement. One analysis highlight how Indian overture to the Taliban government complicate the Pakistan-Afghanistan dynamic.
Pragmatic vs ideological goals: Pakistan’s desire to maintain influence over Afghanistan or at least assure a friendly government there, stands in tension with Islamabad’s internal security imperatives and broader regional alliances. Thus, in the domain of intra-Muslim-state relations, Pakistan’s border-neighbour scenario with Afghanistan is a vivid case of how shared religion does not guarantee harmony when strategic, security and ideological factors intervene.
Turning inward, Pakistan’s relationship with Islamist groups at home presents another facet of how the state balances ideology, security and diplomatic posture. On the one hand, Pakistan projects itself as a Muslim-state with Islamic credentials; on the other, its domestic governance requires controlling militancy, preventing internal insecurity and curbing extremist violence. One notable actor is the Tehreek‑e‑Labbaik Pakistan a hard-line Islamist party which has emerged in recent years, protesting what it regards as insufficient application of Islamic law or perceived state indifference to Islamist causes.
What makes Pakistan’s case interesting is the mixed approach the state adopts: The state has cracked down strongly on Islamist radicalism when it threatens public order or directly challenges state authority. At the same time, Pakistan’s intelligence and military establishment have been accused of fostering Islamist movements abroad for strategic leverage, which undercuts Pakistan’s credibility in promoting an “Islamic” leadership role. The mismatch between Pakistan’s rhetorical leadership of the Muslim-ummah and its internal policy of suppressing Islamist dissent creates tension. The credibility of Pakistan among other Islamic nations is impacted when domestic Islamist parties accuse Islamabad of abandoning Islamic principles or cooperating with Western/Non-Islamic powers.
For example, in the foreign policy domain Pakistan has touted solidarity with Muslim causes such as Palestine or Gaza, but domestically, Pakistani Islamist protesters have argued that Islamabad’s actions do not live up to the rhetoric. This internal-external incoherence complicates Pakistan’s standing in the Muslim world. Pakistan’s internal Islamist dynamics cannot be separated from its external posture among Islamic nations. The state’s management of Islamist groups at home influences how it is perceived abroad — both as a Muslim nation and as a partner among Muslim-majority states.
Beyond neighbours and domestic policy, Pakistan’s aspirations in the Islamic-world diplomacy sphere are also telling. Islamabad has sought to reclaim or reinforce a role as a leading Muslim state — through advocacy at the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, through mediation and through visible participation in Middle-East and broader Muslim-world summits. Pakistan joined consultations of Arab-Islamic nations at the UN General Assembly to forge unified stances.
At a summit in Doha (September 2025), Pakistan backed the idea of an “Arab-Islamic task-force” or a Nato-style alliance of Muslim states — positioning itself as a key player. Pakistan signed a major defence pact with Saudi Arabia that stipulates any attack on one is considered an attack on both — a dramatic elevation of its security diplomacy with a leading Islamic power. Pakistan also emphasises geo-economics in its foreign policy, acknowledging that diplomatic influence among Muslim nations cannot rest solely on religious solidarity. For example, Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar stated that Pakistan’s foreign policy “focuses on geo-economics, peace”.
These initiatives underscore a clear theme: Pakistan recognises that to maintain or rebuild a leadership role in the Muslim-world, it must pair its traditional ideological appeal with credible economic, security and diplomatic performance. As one commentary puts it, under Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif Pakistan is attempting “to reclaim its lost leadership position in the Muslim world central to this effort is Sharif’s recognition that diplomatic prominence cannot be sustained without a strong economic and technological foundation.” While Pakistan maintains close historical ties with many Muslim-majority states, its relationships are increasingly embedded in a more complex and multi-layered strategic environment. Several themes of friction can be identified: The Saudi-Pakistan strategic bond is deep; Riyadh has for decades been a supplier of oil, investor and ally to Islamabad Pakistan has reciprocated with military cooperation and defence training.
The 2025 “attack-on-one is attack-on-both” pact marks a significant formalisation of that relationship. However, this relationship is also challenged by the changing dynamics in the Gulf. Gulf states are diversifying alliances, placing greater emphasis on national interests, formalising ties with India, Israel and other non-Muslim states. For Pakistan, aligning with Saudi Arabia remains valuable — but it must navigate the risk of being seen as a junior partner or of failing to reciprocate expectations (e.g., in energy security, investment inflows, or diplomatic clout).
Pakistan also shares a long border with Iran and has necessity of managing a multi-sectarian society internally (Sunni majority, Shia minority), so ties with Iran are always nuanced. While both are Muslim-majority states, Iran’s revolutionary posture, its alignment with different Islamist strands and the Gulf/Shia-Sunni fault-lines mean that Pakistan must proceed carefully. The need to deepen economic and security ties while navigating sectarian divides is a delicate balancing act. Turkiye (Turkey) has long positioned itself as a proponent of pan-Islamic leadership and has praised Pakistan’s role. For example, the Turkish Parliament speaker stated in April 2025; “Turkey and Pakistan are two shining stars of the Islamic world historic responsibility falls upon both countries.”
Yet, Turkey has its own independent ambitions and Pakistan’s ability to remain first among equals in the Muslim world faces competition from other powers such as Turkey, Iran and the Gulf states. Pakistan’s credibility among Islamic nations is affected not just by what it says, but by what it does: If Pakistan advocates for Palestinian rights, Muslim solidarity or Muslim unity but is seen domestically to suppress Islamist protestors or if it is seen to pursue Western-aligned policies for economic or security reasons, other Islamic states may question its sincerity. Moreover, as Pakistan pushes for leadership roles in Islamic forums, some Muslim nations may see it through the lens of Pakistan-India rivalry rather than pan-Islamic solidarity — which diminishes its moral authority.
The tensions and contradictions in Pakistan’s posture among Islamic nations yield several deeper implications historically, Pakistan’s claim to being an Islamic leader rested on ideology — the idea of being a homeland for Muslims and a defender of Muslim causes globally. But in the current era, that claim increasingly requires tangible state-capability: stable governance, economic resilience, credible security apparatus and independent foreign policy. As one commentator puts it: “no country can exert moral, political or diplomatic leadership without first securing economic sovereignty and technological competitiveness.” Pakistan’s shift toward geo-economics and partnerships framed not only in Islamic solidarity but in economic and strategic logic suggests that the old ideological model needs reinvention.
A striking paradox emerges: domestically Pakistan suppresses—or co-opts—Islamist groups as part of its internal governance and security priorities; externally it positions itself as a champion of Muslim causes and calls for collective action among Muslim states. These two roles are not seamlessly aligned.
The internal crackdown may diminish Pakistan’s ideological appeal among more radical Islamist elements abroad; conversely, Pakistan’s external alliances may require compromises that upset domestic Islamist constituencies. This paradox limits Pakistan’s capacity to simply rely on religious solidarity as the basis of its foreign policy. Other Muslim states are increasingly judging Pakistan by its performance, not just its rhetoric.
Some analysts argue Pakistan’s relevance in the Muslim world is waning — as other states assert more independent identities, shift toward transactional diplomacy and engage with non-Islamic powers (India, China, Russia) more freely. For Pakistan, whose historical prestige among the ummah relied in part on being the only nuclear-armed Muslim-majority state, the question is whether that prestige alone suffices in the emerging multipolar world. As one report suggests: “the defence agreement with Saudi Arabia is a diplomatic revolution for Pakistan externally, it amplifies Pakistan’s claim to being an indispensable power for the Islamic world. But for India, the optics are damaging.”
The border frictions with Afghanistan, support or non-interference in militant activity and Pakistan’s internal conflicts with Islamist groups also pose reputational and strategic risks. If Pakistan is seen as unable to contain militant groups, hostile to some Islamist movements or inconsistent in its Islamic solidarity, its leadership credentials are undermined. Moreover, such conflicts draw in neighbouring Muslim states—as mediators, critics or victims—which complicates Pakistan’s standing. Given the above dynamics, what are the likely trajectories for Pakistan’s role in the Muslim world and what should it prioritise?
Pakistan’s future influence will depend on its ability to match its diplomatic rhetoric with tangible outcomes: trade, investment, technological cooperation, security assurance, regional connectivity. Among Muslim-majority states, there is increasing emphasis on pragmatic cooperation rather than purely ideological solidarity. Pakistan must therefore deliver on its internal economic transformation (allowing it to be a credible partner) as well as on its external commitments (defence, diplomacy, mediation).
For Pakistan to carry a credible leadership role among Islamic nations, it must reduce the gap between its domestic Islam-policy and its international Islamic posture. This means dealing more transparently with its Islamist groups, framing its internal stability efforts not as repression of Islamism but as governance and rule-of-law. At the same time, Pakistan should communicate more clearly how its external diplomacy and alliances align with Muslim-world solidarity frameworks rather than opportunistic state-interest alone.
Pakistan can no longer assume a singular leadership role in the Muslim world. It faces competition from Turkey, Iran, the Gulf states, Malaysia, Indonesia. It also must balance relations with non-Muslim major powers (China, Russia, the US) while engaging in Muslim-world forums. The key will be to find niches where Pakistan adds value: perhaps in security cooperation among Muslim states (given its military experience), in Islamic-economic alliances, or in mediation of intra-Muslim conflicts. For instance, Pakistan’s role in the Doha summit (September 2025) where it backed an Arab-Islamic task-force, shows it is still seeking to shape the agenda.
Pakistan’s identity in the Muslim world also depends on perception: being seen as an authentic, independent, and capable Muslim-state, not simply an instrument of others. In this sense, Pakistan’s defence and diplomacy pact with Saudi Arabia may enhance its strategic significance, yet it may also commit Pakistan to roles that limit its flexibility or tie it closely to Gulf agendas. Analysts note that this pact “places Saudi Arabia under the umbrella of Pakistan’s formidable military — and, most significantly, its nuclear arsenal.”
Maintaining credibility means Pakistan must show that its alliances are not just transactional but contribute to broader Muslim-world interests (development, security, unity) In sum, Pakistan’s relationships with other Islamic nations in recent times reflect a deep and multi-dimensional set of challenges and possibilities. The period 2024-25 in particular has laid bare perhaps more clearly than ever the tensions between Pakistan’s historical ideological aspirations as a leader of the Muslim world and the realities of statecraft in a complex multipolar environment.
On one side, Pakistan is asserting itself: pushing for new Islamic-coalitions, signing major defence pacts, engaging diplomatically with key Muslim states. On the other side, it is constrained by border conflicts (with Afghanistan), security dilemmas (militant groups), domestic Islamist politics, economic vulnerabilities and the crowded competition of Muslim-world leadership.
For Pakistan to succeed in reshaping narratives and perceptions — which is especially relevant for your magazine’s readership of youth and analysts — its future path must integrate three core elements: internal stability and economic performance, strategic independence and credible alliances, and an Islamic-world diplomacy that is rooted not just in rhetoric but in results.
