By Mehak Farooq
There is a rhythm to Pakistan’s proxy war against India, a pattern that becomes visible every time one looks closely at the major terror attacks of the last two decades. Nagrota in 2016 fits that pattern with striking precision. It was not a standalone event or a sudden eruption of radicalised violence. It was a carefully timed intervention by a Pakistan-backed terror ecosystem that has long served as Islamabad’s pressure valve whenever the country finds itself cornered — diplomatically, politically or militarily.
Terror groups do not act on instinct. They act when given space, direction and opportunity. Jeish-e-Mohammed, perhaps more than any other organisation, has repeatedly surfaced at moments when Pakistan’s establishment needs to shift attention, reclaim initiative or demonstrate relevance. The attack on the 166 Field Regiment camp in Nagrota came at a moment of acute vulnerability for Pakistan: India had conducted surgical strikes weeks earlier, the global spotlight was firmly on Pakistan’s terror safe havens, and the Pakistani Army was undergoing a sensitive leadership transition.
Seen through this lens, the Nagrota attack becomes a familiar chapter in a long-running playbook. JeM terrorists breached the camp in the early hours, heading straight towards the living quarters that housed officers and their families. Their objective was not simply to kill but to create a spectacle — something that would dominate public conversation in India, unsettle the military, and reassure Pakistan’s domestic audience that its proxies were still capable of delivering calibrated shocks. This is the pattern: whenever Pakistan faces pressure, a terror strike follows.
One does not have to look far back to recognise the same cycle. After the Parliament attack in 2001, analysts quickly noted that it followed a period of embarrassment for Pakistan over its role in supporting the Taliban. The Mumbai attacks in 2008 were preceded by internal political turbulence and international scrutiny of Pakistan’s security establishment. Uri in 2016 came at a time when Pakistan’s Kashmir narrative was faltering on the global stage. Pulwama in 2019 arrived when Pakistan was under economic stress and diplomatic isolation. And years later, the Pahalgam attack in 2025 — carried out by the Lashkar proxy TRF — reflected another moment of internal instability.
Nagrota, placed in this timeline, becomes easy to decode. It was Pakistan’s response to the loss of initiative after India’s surgical strikes. A small group of highly trained, Pakistan-backed terrorists crossed into Jammu through established infiltration corridors and carried out a high-impact attack that was meant to show that nothing had changed. The infiltration route, the reconnaissance, the use of disguises and the focus on a residential block all pointed to a deep support network and clear instructions rather than independent action. The terrorists came prepared not only to fight but to project a message.
The National Investigation Agency later put the structure in black and white. The terrorists were Pakistani nationals, trained in Pakistan, moved through a chain of local facilitators, and guided by handlers linked to JeM’s senior leadership. The operation was supervised by Abdul Rouf Asgar, the deputy chief of JeM and the brother of Masood Azhar. All the familiar components of Pakistan’s proxy model were present and intact.
What stands out most is the consistency of the timing. Whenever Pakistan hits a wall — whether diplomatically after global pressure on its terror networks, politically during moments of instability, or strategically after India asserts itself — JeM emerges to remind everyone that Pakistan’s covert reach is still alive. It is less an independent terror organisation and more a valve through which Rawalpindi releases pressure.
Nagrota demonstrated this with clarity. The attack was choreographed to reassert Pakistan’s relevance after the surgical strikes and to stabilise the narrative at home during an Army Chief transition. It revealed that Pakistan’s terror proxies do not strike merely to cause damage; they strike to serve a political and strategic purpose defined elsewhere.
India has long understood this pattern. The world is slowly beginning to. Terrorism from Pakistan is not random; it rises and falls in sync with Pakistan’s own moments of crisis. Nagrota is one of the clearest examples of this cycle — a reminder that Pakistan’s proxy strategy continues to operate with intent, direction and timing that cannot be ignored.
(Hailing from Kashmir and based in New Delhi, Mehak Farooq is a journalist specialising in defence and strategic affairs. Her work spans security, geopolitics, veterans’ welfare, foreign policy, and the evolving challenges of national and regional stability.)
