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Nagrota Revisited: JeM’s Infiltration and the Strength of J&K’s Security Grid

Mehak Farooq by Mehak Farooq
November 27, 2025
in Article, India
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Nagrota Revisited: JeM’s Infiltration and the Strength of J&K’s Security Grid
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By Mehak Farooq

 

Nine years after the terror attack on the Indian Army’s 166 Field Regiment camp in Nagrota, the incident remains one of the clearest reminders of the threats Jammu & Kashmir continues to face from across the border — and of the robust security grid that has since evolved to prevent similar attempts.

 

In the early hours of 29 November 2016, three Jaish-e-Mohammed militants infiltrated into Jammu after being trained and guided in Pakistan. Their target was the Nagrota camp, where they launched a fidayeen assault that claimed the lives of seven Indian army personnel, before they were eliminated. What unsettled the region most was the fact that the attackers managed to reach a residential enclave inside the camp — a space meant for families, not combat.

 

Today, as J&K enjoys significantly greater stability and sharply reduced levels of militancy, the events at Nagrota continue to serve as a crucial case study. They explain how infiltrators entered, how they exploited gaps in the grid, and how India responded by reinforcing its security architecture at multiple levels.

 

How the Terrorists Entered Jammu

 

Investigations by security agencies reconstructed the militants’ journey in meticulous detail. They did not cross the Line of Control as many might assume; instead, they slipped across the international border sector, an area historically exploited by Pakistan-backed groups. Their path into Jammu bore all the hallmarks of a well-organised cross-border network.

 

Once they entered Indian territory, the three militants were quietly moved across several districts. They relied on temporary shelters, local over-ground workers, vehicles arranged in advance, and a string of safe houses. Every movement — from pick-up points to drop-off locations — had been prepared by facilitators. This logistical trail allowed them to reach Jammu without triggering an early alarm, highlighting the deep penetration of Pakistan’s support networks at the time.

 

The final stretch towards Nagrota involved reconnaissance by local helpers who studied patrol timings, mapped approach routes and guided the infiltrators to the camp’s periphery. Nothing about the attack was spontaneous. It was the product of a structured ecosystem nurtured across the border and assisted by enablers within.

 

Inside the Camp: What the Attack Revealed

 

Once the militants breached the perimeter, the nature of the operation became clear. They split into small assault teams and headed directly towards the living quarters, indicating familiarity with the layout of Indian military installations. Their tactics reflected training in close-quarter battle and a deliberate intention to create maximum panic by targeting spaces seen as safe havens for families. The use of police uniforms to breach the initial security layer mirrored past JeM operations in the region and reinforced the level of preparation behind the strike.

 

But the attackers were met with swift, controlled force. Despite the pressure created by the presence of women and infants inside the residential complex, Indian soldiers responded with remarkable discipline, conducting room combat, evacuating families, isolating the attackers and preventing a hostage crisis. Every civilian inside the camp survived.

 

How the Security Grid Transformed After Nagrota

 

The attack exposed certain vulnerabilities, but it also catalysed a major transformation in J&K’s security architecture. Surveillance along the border was expanded, with additional sensors, fencing upgrades, night-vision systems and coordinated patrolling. Agencies began working in tighter loops, reducing reaction time and improving situational awareness.

 

A decisive shift came in the treatment of OGW networks. For years, these networks were the silent backbone of infiltration attempts — providing shelter, transport, communication and reconnaissance to Pakistan-backed militants. After Nagrota, security forces prioritised dismantling these networks.

 

Large numbers of OGWs linked to JeM, Lashkar-e-Taiba and their proxies were detained, neutralised or cut off from their handlers, resulting in a dramatic decrease in militant mobility.

 

Military and police installations across Jammu also underwent security upgrades. Layered access controls, enhanced lighting, CCTV integration and routine vulnerability assessments became standard practice. Community policing deepened; civilians in towns like Nagrota formed a closer information loop with security agencies, often alerting forces to suspicious movement before infiltration could progress. Inter-agency coordination — among the Army, J&K Police, CRPF, BSF and intelligence units — became seamless, allowing faster response and closing the gaps militants once exploited.

 

Why Nagrota Still Matters

 

Compared to a decade ago, high-impact terror attacks in J&K have sharply declined. Yet Nagrota remains a reminder of three unchanging truths. First, cross-border threats persist even when local militancy appears weak. A small, well-trained group can still cause significant damage if undetected. Second, the logistical networks that sustain such infiltrations — the OGWs, the safe houses, the cross-border handlers — are often more important than the attackers themselves. Breaking these networks has been one of the central reasons for the region’s improved stability. And third, Jammu is not immune simply because the Valley remains the traditional hotspot. Attacks in Samba, Sunjuwan, Kathua and Nagrota proved long ago that the threat envelope extends across the region.

 

A Region That Refused to Panic

 

What people in Nagrota recall most vividly is not the chaos of that morning but the unity that followed. Shops stayed shut in respect. Residents helped shift families out of danger. Children placed flowers outside the Army camp for days afterwards. The attack did not fracture the region — it drew civilians and security forces closer.

 

Nagrota’s scars remain in memory, but so does its lesson: the people of Jammu & Kashmir do not yield to Pakistan’s attempts at disruption, and the security grid they stand behind today is stronger, sharper and far more resilient than the one that existed in 2016.

 

(Hailing from Kashmir and based in New Delhi, Mehak Farooq is a journalist specialising in defence and strategic affairs. Her work spans security, geopolitics, veterans’ welfare, foreign policy, and the evolving challenges of national and regional stability.)

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